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Abstract 
 
The tragedy of the anti-commons unfolds when separate social agents—be they private 
owners of a property who intend to use the property for their own economic benefit or 
political actors who pursue their political objectives—do not hold effective rights to use their 
economic or political power for their own purposes without consent of the other players of the 
economic or political game. I shall discuss the Greek government debt crisis and the Eurozone 
countries’ policies toward Greece within the analytical framework of the tragedy of the 
anticommons in this paper. I do not intend to dig deep into the structure and long-term trends 
of public and private finances in Greece. I shall only show that the successive bail-out 
programs of the Eurozone countries were doomed to fail because of these countries’ 
“competitive” and non-cooperative approach to the Greek financial problems. I shall also 
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 2 
Introduction 
 
The tragedy of the anti-commons unfolds when separate social agents—be they private 
owners of a property who intend to use the property for their own economic benefit or 
political actors who pursue their political objectives—do not hold effective rights to use their 
economic or political power for their own purposes without the consent of the other players of 
the economic or political game. Tragedy of the anticommons is conventionally contrasted 
with the more familiar tragedy of the commons, in which multiple owners of a common-pool 
resource hold effective rights of use but not of exclusion, resulting in systematic resource 
over-utilization.
1
 In the tragedy of anticommons resources will be systematically under-
utilized. 
 The first papers on the anticommons problem were published in the 1990s
2
 and they 
reached back to Ronald Coase’s work on externalities and transaction costs.3 These papers 
focused on the legal aspects of property utilization and explained the anticommons problem 
with the players’ erroneous strategy formulation and with the substantial transaction costs that 
multiple players face in a competitive and non-cooperative environment. But it turned out 
fairly soon that the tragedy of the anticommons may also unfold by assuming fully rational 
players and zero transaction costs if the initial property rights of the interconnected players 
are not clearly defined. This important result contradicts to Coase’s conclusion who argued 
that the efficient allocation of property rights can always be attained if transaction costs are 
close to zero.
4
 Buchanan and Yoon (2000) presented a fairly simple but convincing example 
of the above assertion by demonstrating that in case two (or more) fully rational 
                                                 
1
 See, e.g., Hardin (1968), Ostrom (1990), and Ostrom et al. (1994). 
2
 See, e.g., Heller (1998), (1999), Fennell (2011). 
3
 Coase (1960). 
4
 About the importance of transaction costs see also Williamson (1981). 
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economic actors require the consent of all other players in utilizing their own product or 
service and they uncooperatively set their commodity’s price, the total price of the commodity 
will be higher and demand will be lower than the Pareto efficient outcome. Schulz, Parisi and 
Depoorter (2002), and Parisi, Schulz and Depoorter (2004) arrived at similar conclusions. 
I shall discuss the Greek government debt crisis and the Eurozone countries’ policies 
toward Greece within the analytical framework of the tragedy of the anticommons in this 
paper. I do not intend to dig deep into the structure and long-term trends of public and private 
finances in Greece. I shall only show that the successive bail-out programs of the Eurozone 
countries were doomed to fail because of these countries’ “competitive” and non-cooperative 
approach to the Greek financial problems. 
 The structure of the paper is as follows: Then I present the main hypothesis and the 
motivation of the analysis in section 2. I shall demonstrate the tragedy of the anticommons 
and its analytical, modeling tools with two simple games in section 3. The first one is similar 
to the model Buchanan and Yoon (2000). The second one is an extended application of the 
double marginalization problem. The application of the anticommons framework to the Greek 
debt crisis and to the Eurozone countries’ bail-out programs is given in Section 4. Conclusion 
is given in section 5. 
 
Motivation: Does Competition Always Foster Efficiency? 
 
The essence of the anticommons approach is that competition—so much cherished by our 
profession—does not always reap a Pareto-efficient allocation of the economic resources. If 
private property owners have the right of exclusion but not the right of autonomous use, 
cooperation rather than competition among them will result in a more efficient outcome. 
The tragedy of the anticommons can be contrasted with the tragedy of the commons. As, 
for instance, Garrett Hardin (1968) demonstrated, if a property is publicly owned by multiple 
 4 
owners they will be tempted to overuse the property that will ultimately result in the 
property’s depletion. But private ownership cannot guarantee the efficient use of a property 
either if the owners have limited rights of use of their property. (See, e.g. Heller (2013). Parisi 
et al. (2005), Vanneste et al. (2006), and Depoorter and Vanneste (2007) contrasted the tragedy 
of the anticommons with the tragedy of the commons by showing that we can expect under-
utilization of capacities and excessive prices of the final products with the former while the 
opposite will occur if a tragedy of the commons unfolds. A well-known example of the 
tragedy of the anticommons is the case when an investor—be him private or public—plans 
to construct a highway and he needs the consent of a large number of estate owners along 
the highway’s track. Producing and introducing new drugs in the pharmaceutical market 
also provide us with convincing examples. Assume that a pharmaceutical company needs to 
use several components to produce a new medicine that fights cancer, and those 
components have been developed by different patent holders. Then each patent holder will 
strive to push up his or her price for the patent—i.e., the patent holders engage in a “price-
up” competition—that will ultimately result in too little production and in an excessive price 
of the new drug. 
 The successive sovereign debt crises of the Eurozone countries or in a broader 
framework, those of the members of the European Union (EU) also provide us with good and 
insightful examples of the anti-commons approach. We have chosen the Greek financial crisis 
to demonstrate how the analytical framework of the tragedy of the anti-commons can be 
applied to better understand why the efforts of the EU countries have reaped limited results. 
 
Two Simple Models of the Tragedy of the Anticommons 
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Before advancing to the main issue of this paper, I shall outline two simple models of the 
anticommons just to demonstrate the logic of the anticommons approach.
5
 First, assume that 
two countries construct a cross-border railway network to speed up the transportation process 
between them. Each country sets a unit price for transportation on the new network 
independent of what the other country charges for transportation services. Country 1 charges 
unit price
1p while country 2’s unit price is 2p . Any user of the railway network must pay the 
total price 21 pp  . I assume zero marginal and fixed costs of transportation in order to 
simplify the analysis. Total market demand for railway transport is given by: 
 211 ppQ  , (1) 
where Q is quantity of total transportation demand. 
Each country will maximize its profits: 
         22122121211211 1,;1, ppppQppppppQpp   . (2) 
The first order conditions of profit maximization are: 
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From the first order conditions of the countries’ profit maximization problem we have: 
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As can be easily seen from equation (4), country 1 and country 2 will equally earn 1/9 in 
terms of profits. 
 Should the two countries coordinate their pricing strategies and set a uniform price for 
transportation services, they could arrive at higher total profits while customers would pay a 
lower price for the service as shown below. 
 
                                                 
5
 The example follows the logic of Buchanan and Yoon (2000). 
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Proposition 1: Had the two countries coordinated their pricing strategy by setting a single 
price p for the transportation service, the retail price of service would have been lower while 
the quantity demanded at that price would have been higher in the market, resulting in larger 
net benefits for all the players. 
Proof: The countries maximize total profits from transportation services by finding the 
optimum price: 
            pppQppp
pppp
 1maxmax)1(maxmax 21  . (5) 
where  1;0  is country 1’s share from total profit. 
From the first order condition of profit maximization we have: 
 
 
4/1)(;2/1;2/1021  pQpp
dp
pd


. (6) 
Comparing the results in equations (4) and (6) immediately shows that transport customers 
pay a lower price and the countries earn a higher profit in total with than without 
coordination. 
 
The above result is a special application of the well-known prisoners’ dilemma game. It 
shows that coordination sometimes results in larger benefits to all the participants of an 
economic or political game than competition. 
 The second example is about two pharmaceutical companies and two patent holders 
whose components are needed for the firms to produce and sell their drug in the retail market. 
I shall show that in case the pharmaceutical retailers compete in the market with substitute 
drugs, and they both use two different components to produce their drug, and those 
components are owned and produced by two different patent holders, a merger of the 
retailers—that is, less rather than more competition—already results in lower prices for 
consumers. If the patent holders merge it has no effect on prices. But in case the retailers and 
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the patent holders also merge, the price of the drug will be even further reduced. 
 Assume that two firms produce and sell two different but substitute drugs—one of 
each—in the retail market. They both use the same two components that are owned by two 
different patent holders in producing their drug. The retailers do not incur costs others than 
paying a separate royalty fee to patent holder 1 and patent holder 2 after each unit of the drug 
sold. We denote these royalty fees 
1w and 2w . Retailer 1 charges the price 1r , while retailer 
2 sets her price at 2r  for each unit sold. Patent holders 1 and 2 incur a unit cost 
(constant marginal cost) of producing the components for the drugs 1c  and 2c , respectively, 
plus the fixed cost  of  R&D  in  component  development  in  the  amount of 1F  and 2F , 
respectively.  The demand functions for drug 1 and drug 2 are as follows: 
 211 1 arrq  , and 212 1 rarq  , respectively, (7) 
where q1 and q2  denote the quantity sold from drug 1 and drug 2, while 1a  is the parameter 
of substitution between the two drugs. Notice that I assumed the same “strength” of 
substitution for the two firms. Retailers maximize their profits: 
       2121211 1
11
1max,max wwrarrrr
rr
 , and (8) 
      21221212 1
22
1max,max wwrrarrr
rr
 , respectively. (9) 
The first order conditions for profit maximum are: 
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Solving for 1r and for 2r we have: 
 
a
ww
rr



2
1 21
21 . (12) 
Plugging the results from (12) back into equation in (7) obtains: 
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Demand facing each of the two patent holders is given by equations (12). 
Patent holders also maximize profits: 
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where 1 and 2 denote the patent holders’ profit. The first order conditions are as follows: 
 
 
0
2
)1(
2
)1()1(21, 121
1
211 








a
ca
a
wawa
w
ww
, and (16) 
 
 
0
2
)1(
2
)1(2)1(1, 221
2
212 








a
ca
a
wawa
w
ww
. (17) 
Solving the first order conditions obtains: 
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Using the results from (18) we have: 
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Substituting the results from (17) into equations (12) we have: 
 
 
)2(3
)1(
)2(3
1 21
21
a
cca
a
qq




 , and (21) 
 
   
)2)(1(3
)1(35
)2(3
)1(
)2)(1(3
2
2
1 2121
21
aa
ccaa
a
cca
aaa
rr









 . (22) 
 9 
If the two retailers merged, the new firm would face demand rq 1 ; and it would 
maximize profits  21)1()( wwrrr  . The monopoly’s price and quantity sold would 
become: 
 
2
1 21 wwr

 ;    
 
2
1 21 wwq

 . (23) 
Plugging the expression of q from (23) into the patent holders’ profit function obtains: 
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From the first order conditions of profit maximum we have: 
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Ultimately, the drug’s retail price and quantity will be: 
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Comparing  r in (26) and 21 rr   in equation (22) shows that the retail price of the merged 
firm will be lower than the retail prices of the two competing drugs, if: 
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Since the left-hand side of the equation is always non-negative for 1a , and it is larger than 
1 for any 10  a , while the right-hand side will be smaller than 1 for any realistic values of 
21 cc  , the equation in (27) will always hold. Consequently, the merged firm sells the drug at 
a lower price and it sells a larger quantity than the competing retailers. 
 If the merged retailer also merges with the patent holders, then the new firm’s profit will 
be: 
   2121)1( FFccrr  . (28) 
The first order condition of profit maximum immediately yields: 
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2
1 21 ccr

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2
1 21 ccq

 . (29) 
The fully merged firm’s price will be lower and the quantity sold will be larger than with 
separate patent holders if: 121  cc , a condition that will always be satisfied. We can 
summarize the above results in proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2: If firms compete in a “downstream” and also in an “upstream” market their 
profit maximizing outcome will be less efficient than in case the firms in both markets 
cooperated. 
Proof: The proof of Proposition 2 is given in equations (27) and (29) above. 
 
Now we turn to our main question about the Greek government debt crisis and the bail-out 
program of the Eurozone countries: could it have reaped better results than what actually 
occurred? 
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The Greek Government Debt Crisis as Tragedy of the Anticommons 
 
The literature on the Greek financial crisis would fill libraries
 
so we do not discuss its 
reasons and potential impacts on the EU in this paper.
6
 We focus on one issue only: how 
much does it cost to the Eurozone countries to save Greece from total financial collapse if 
they can agree on a joint bail-out plan or in case they cannot. 
 Greece accumulated a substantial government debt that amounted to 130% relative 
to GDP in 2010, to 148% in 2011, and its debt relative to GDP hiked to 177% in 
2012. It decreased then to 156.9% in 2013, due to the government’s effort to meet the 
conditions of the IMF and the EC.
7 
The remaining sixteen member countries of the 
Eurozone agreed to contribute to a financial assistance package for Greece in 2010. 
The Eurozone countries demanded that Greece implemented an austerity program along 
with a comprehensive structural reform of its government finances. Two additional bail-
out plans have followed since, without great success. Greece obviously strived for 
receiving maximum financial assistance for the “price” (effort) it had to pay in terms of 
austerity measures, while the donor countries had two options to choose from: they could 
either cooperate in designing a bail-out plan, or they could individually decide how much 
they were willing to contribute to the Greek financial assistance package and under what 
conditions. We exclude the possibility that the Eurozone countries would let Greece 
down, for the risk of the European Union’s disintegration would largely increase and that 
would be too high a cost for them to pay. 
 
  
                                                 
6
 See, for instance, Haidar, J. I. (2012), Krugman, P. (2011), Financial Times (2012), OECD (2012). 
 
7
 Source: Eurostat (2014). 
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The Greek Government Debt Crisis: An Anti-Commons Model 
 
First, we discuss the case when the donor countries set the effort level they demand 
from Greece in return to their assistance separately, without coordination. We can safely 
assume that Greece’s demand for the amount of financial assistance is a decreasing 
function of the effort it has to pay for the Eurozone countries’ help. We also assume that 
the donor countries maximize the net benefit of helping Greece. Finally, we assume that 
the lower the amount of financial assistance the larger the risk of future disintegration of 
the EU becomes. We can model the “game” among the donor countries under the above 
conditions. 
 Let NCF denote the amount of total financial assistance from the donor countries with no 
coordination, and ei the “price” (effort) country k charges for its contribution. Let Greece’s 
demand for assistance from country k be: 
kkk
NC
k ebaf   (30) 
where 
NC
kf  is the financial assistance from country k when the donor countries do not 
coordinate the assistance program, and ak and bk are parameters. (ak may denote a fraction of 
Greece’s total government debt, while bk can be a country specific indicator, for instance, the 
country’s size, or another indicator of its “economic and political strength”, with 


n
k
kb
1
1.) 
 Then Greece’s total demand for assistance facing the donor countries is: 



n
k
kk
NC ebAF
1
 (31) 
where 


n
k
kaA
1
is Greece’s total government debt. 
 If country i’s net benefit from helping Greece is given by: 
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where NCiw is a welfare function of country i and  iiiiii ebaCfC )(  is the country’s cost of 
extending financial assistance to Greece. In order to avoid tedious algebra I assume that the 
cost function is linear in ei and given as  iiii ebac  . The donor countries maximize their net 
benefit, thus the effort level each donor country can get from Greece can be derived from: 
    












 

iiiii
n
k
kk
e
NC
i
e
ebaCeebAw
ii 1
maxmax .  (33) 
 The first order conditions of the system of equations in (33) yield: 
 nic
b
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e i
i
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i ,...,1,  . (34) 
Substituting the above result back into Greece’s demand function for assistance given by 
equation (31) we have: 
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The “price” (effort) Greece must pay for assistance will be as follows: 
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where the left hand side denotes the total (weighted) effort required from Greece. 
 If we assume that the donor country’s “investment costs” with regard to Greece’s bail-
out program are non-linear
8
, say, the cost functions are quadratic in NCif : 
                                                 
8
 The reviewer of my manuscript suggested that I should use non-linear cost functions in the analysis of the 
Greek bail-out program. I shall show below that assuming a non-linear rather than linear cost function would not 
alter the main conclusions of the paper. 
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the first order conditions of welfare maximization would become: 
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while the Eurozone countries’ total financial assistance, and Greece’s total effort would be: 
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Comparing the Results of the Eurozone Countries’ Non-Coordinated Actions to a 
Coordinated Approach 
 
Now we turn to the case when the Eurozone countries coordinate their assistance program. 
The effort level they require from Greece will be identical across countries and we shall 
denote it CE . Greece’s demand for assistance then becomes: 
   C
n
k
C
kk
C
n
k
C
k EAEbaFf  
 11
 (41) 
where
CC
k Ff  and denote country k’s financial assistance and total financial assistance, 
respectively, with coordination among the donor countries. 
 From the welfare maximization problem of the donor countries—that act now as a 
“monopoly”—we have: 
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denotes the donor countries’ average cost of granting financial assistance to 
Greece. Plugging the above result back to Greece’s demand for the total amount of financial 
assistance yields: 
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 We shall derive the results with the countries’ non-linear cost function as before. Now 
the net benefit from coordinated assistance will be: 
      
2
2C
CCC EAEEAEW

 . (44) 
From the first order condition of maximizing  CEW  we immediately have: 
 
3
2A
EC  , and 
3
A
F C  . (45) 
Based on the above results we can formulate the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3: If the Eurozone countries unilaterally and non-cooperatively decide about their 
contribution to the Greek assistance program, Greece must pay a higher price for a smaller 
amount of assistance than in case the donor countries cooperated in designing the Greek bail-
out plan. The donor countries would also have attained higher welfare with than without 
cooperation. These results hold under general conditions, too, for instance, when the donor 
countries have non-linear cost functions. 
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Proof: It can be immediately seen from comparing NCF  in equations (35) and (39), and CF  
in equations (43) and (45), moreover 


n
k
kk
NC ebE
1
in equations (36) and (40), moreover CE  
in equations (42) and (45) that total financial assistance will be smaller, while the price 
Greece must pay for the assistance will by higher without than with cooperation among the 
donor countries if 1n . By substituting these results in the donor countries’ welfare 
maximization problem yields lower welfare to these countries without than with cooperation. 
Q.e.d. 
 Finally, we need to address the question how would the donor countries’ behavior 
change if a coordinating agency – say, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – became a 
part of the negotiations on the Greek bail-out program among the countries.
9
 The answer to 
this question is far from being obvious. We need to consider two options. Assume that the 
coordinating agency is capable of and it actually does calculate the optimal level of total 
financial assistance to Greece, also each donor country’s individual contribution, and 
Greece’s optimum level of effort. In the first case we need to assume that the coordinating 
agency is capable of negotiating with all the donor countries and with Greece so that all 
information of the negotiations immediately becomes common knowledge among all 
participating countries. Then we can expect that the coordinated outcome of the countries’ 
game will occur. 
 In the second case, however, when all the countries have complete information about the 
negotiations but their information is not common knowledge among the participants, the 
donor countries will be tempted to free-ride on one another. Notice that the efficient level of 
Greece’s effort is a “public good” for the donor countries now. To demonstrate this 
hypothesis assume that a coordinator signs an agreement with Greece how much effort that 
                                                 
9
 The reviewer of my paper suggested that I should address this case, too, for which and I am grateful to her/him. 
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country will exert (“supply”) at different levels of the donor countries’ financial assistance.   
Greece’s supply of effort is given by: 
 


n
i
ifE
1
 (46) 
The donor countries will individually find the optimum level of their financial support by 
solving 
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where 
n
f
n
i
i
1  is country i’s valuation of Greece’s effort and iii
n
i
i fcff 






1
is the country’s 
cost of extending financial support. From the first order conditions of (47) we get: 
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
 . (48) 
Comparing the results in equation (48) and in equations (42) and (43) it immediately obtains 
that both financial support and Greece’s effort will be lower now than if the donor countries 
coordinated. If Greece’s effort is a public good we face a “tragedy of the commons”. 
 
Conclusions 
 
We can conclude the above analysis that by applying simple tools of economics and game 
theory we were able to demonstrate the strength and applicability of the tragedy of the 
anticommons’ analytical framework: the bail-out programs of the Eurozone countries can 
easily fail if the countries pursue their own, uncoordinated strategies in assisting Greece or 
other troubled countries. The donor countries will require too high an effort from, and provide 
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insufficient financial help to the recipient country that just maintains and exacerbates the 
problem of its government debt. 
 In case, a coordinating agency joins the negotiations among Greece and the donor 
countries the outcome of their “game” will strongly depend on the information structure of the 
game. If all information of the negotiations is common knowledge among the participants and 
the coordinating agency can enforce their agreement we can expect that the coordinated 
solution will unfold that I demonstrated above. However, should the participants possess only 
complete information but no common knowledge about their negotiations the outcome of 
their game will easily become a “tragedy of the commons”.  
 The analysis can be extended in several directions. We can incorporate the issues of 
moral hazard with regard to financial assistance, and we can transform the above model into a 
dynamic one that analyses the effects of uncoordinated or coordinated efforts of the donor 
countries on a longer time horizon. 
 With moral hazard, the donor countries possess only imperfect information about 
Greece’s effort to implement its economic reform program. They may be able to induce high 
effort from Greece but external conditions may undermine its endeavor. If we take moral 
hazard into account, it exacerbates the negative effects of the donor countries’ uncoordinated 
actions: Greece and the donor countries would be even worse off than with perfect 
information among the “players”. 
 The outcome of the game would considerably change if the countries played it in a 
dynamic framework. Then both the donors and Greece could learn from previous experience 
and send signals to each other about expected future behavior. As in a dynamic prisoners’ 
dilemma, donor countries would opt for coordinated action that would result in higher payoffs 
for everyone. 
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